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Executive Summary

Problem Statement
Since 2006 the number of housing foreclosures has increased significantly. This increase is
taking a toll on many communities across the nation, including Louisville, Kentucky. The
percentage of delinquent mortgage loans in the Commonwealth of Kentucky has risen sharply,
jumping nearly 3.5% since 2006, while the percentage of delinquent loans entering foreclosure
has risen just as sharply according to the Kentucky Office of the Courts. The number of
foreclosed properties proceeding to Master Commissioner sale has more than tripled between
2002 and 2008, to over 3000 foreclosures scheduled to take place. The number of foreclosures
is negatively impacting the local, state and federal governments. Kentucky is expected to lose
up to $3.4 million between 2007 and 2009 in property tax revenue due to the increases in
foreclosures. Many homeowners are searching for a way to relieve their delinquent payments
and the Federal Government is making many efforts to assist them. The National Foreclosure
Mitigation Counseling program is one of those efforts.
Research Strategy
The research will utilize the regression model and a multinomial logit model to assess the
foreclosure mitigation counseling program from the Housing Partnership, Inc.
• Does the number of days delinquent impact mitigation success?
• What role does the reason for default play in predicting when a household seeks
assistance?
• How is the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program being marketed,
including outreach efforts?
• Are there any addition undetermined factors that could influence when a
household contacts the Housing Partnership for assistance?
Major Findings
The findings from the regression model and the multinomial logit model suggests the
foreclosure mitigation counseling program does not appear to be targeting or assisting the
types of households who would most need foreclosure mitigation counseling assistance.
Recommendations
It is recommended that the Housing Partnership redefine its outreach efforts for the program
to attract households before it is too late to avert foreclosure. It is also recommended that
policy makers seek further analysis of the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program
to determine the true effectiveness. A further multinomial logit model should be estimated to
2

determine the impact on different demographics of the households who seek foreclosure
mitigation counseling assistance.
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Problem Statement

This paper offers a preliminary evaluation of the Housing Partnership, Inc.’s National
Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program in Louisville. The research will consider the
characteristics of the households that are seeking housing foreclosure mitigation counseling
assistance from the Housing Partnership and determine if the program should be adjusted to
increase effectiveness. No evaluation has been conducted of the program to date; the program
continued through December 2009. The research will test the following hypotheses:
1. The characteristics of a household type, household’s lien position, lien holder type, the
type of mortgage term, and the days late on a mortgage payment will likely affect a
household’s reason for default.
2. The type of household, the lien position, lien holder type, the type of mortgage term,
and the days late on a mortgage payment influence the interest rates of households
seeking foreclosure mitigation counseling assistance.
The following are some research questions that I will utilize to assists in reaching answers to the
hypotheses stated above.
1. Does the number of days delinquent impact mitigation success?
2. What role does the reason for default play in predicting when a household seeks
assistance?
3. How is the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program being marketed,
including outreach efforts?
4. Are there any additional factors that influence when a household contacts the Housing
Partnership for assistance?
The National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program has guidelines established by the
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation Act, signed into legislation on December 26, 2007, 1
that determines the program structure to be used when a local agency is provided funds from
the Housing Partnership Network national agency was already provided by. The structuring of
the program fell upon the NeighborWorks America non-profit organization to provide the
guidelines and tracking of the data. Like many Federal programs, NeighborWorks America had
to establish guidelines to disseminate the funds across the nation as quickly as possible. To
disseminate the funds as quickly as possible, NeighborWorks America held a competitive grant
process to distribute the dollars to the areas of greatest need. In addition, NeighborWorks had
to establish a method for capturing the data as quickly as possible, which is why they turned to
Counselor Max, a pre-designed reporting system organized by the Housing Partnership
Network. The program provided quick predetermined answers to many data intake fields in the

1

Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation Act (42 U.S.C. 8101-8107)
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data collection instrument, allowing for uniform responses across the nation and easy tracing
by NeighborWorks America.
The predetermined data fields have led to one of the first problems with the foreclosure
mitigation counseling program. The predetermined fields have a tendency to provide
inconclusive answers for households, compared to manual entry of data by the program
administrators from the Housing Partnership, Inc. Due to the uniform structure of the program,
nationwide results can be recorded as consistently as possible for similar data fields. Utilizing
the predetermined fields, this study will attempt to see what role the current mortgage interest
rate plays in households that seek foreclosure mitigation counseling assistance.

Literature Review

Foreclosure Background
To effectively understand the need for foreclosure mitigation counseling services in Louisville, it
is important to understand the foreclosure situation in Louisville. Due to Louisville and
Jefferson County being a merged City-County government, the Housing Partnership works
throughout Jefferson County and the City of Louisville. A mortgage is a conveyance of or a lien
against property (for securing a loan) that becomes void upon payment or performance
according to stipulated terms 2. Foreclosure is a legal proceeding that bars or extinguishes a
mortgager’s right of redeeming a mortgaged estate 3. When a property owner has a mortgage
they are typically contractually obligated to make mortgage payments every 30 days to the lien
holder on that property. If a mortgage payment is late, the payment becomes delinquent. If a
barrower is unable to make a mortgage payment after 90 days, the mortgage is typically
considered to be in default. Once a mortgage is in default, the mortgage holder may begin a
foreclosure process on the property4. The foreclosure process in the United States is not a
uniform procedure. The foreclosure process is structurally different in all 50 states throughout
the nation.
The Kentucky foreclosure process is a judicial only process with varying timelines for the
process of a foreclosure proceeding. The primary security instrument in the Commonwealth of
Kentucky is a mortgage held in the form of a lien on the property. The foreclosure process also
offers a right of redemption, which is a strict guideline process that allows the foreclosed
property owner to reclaim their property, and Kentucky offers a deficiency judgment with

2

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, “mortgage”, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mortgage
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, “foreclosure”, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/foreclosure
4
Housing Foreclosures in Kentucky, Program Review and Investigations Committee, Legislative Research
Commission; Emily Spurlcok, Colleen Kennedy, Carlos Lopes, and Mike Clark, Ph.D., Frankfort, Kentucky; July 9,
2009.
3
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restrictions5. The following flow chart (Figure 1) explains a foreclosure process in Kentucky,
with the gray shaded blocks as the typical foreclosure path.
Figure 1:
The Foreclosure Process in Kentucky

Source: Housing Foreclosures in Kentucky, Program Review and Investigations Committee, Legislative Research Commission; Emily Spurlcok,
Colleen Kennedy, Carlos Lopes, and Mike Clark, Ph.D., Frankfort, Kentucky; July 9, 2009.

5
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Kentucky Foreclosure Law Summary Quick Facts,
http://www.foreclosurelaw.org/Kentucky_Foreclosure_Law.htm
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Now that the foreclosure process in Kentucky has been defined, it is important to understand
the foreclosure situation in Kentucky, which includes Louisville. Since a foreclosure cannot
begin until a barrower becomes delinquent on their mortgage payments, we must first look at
the delinquent loan situation of Kentucky. The following graph (Figure 2) depicts the number of
delinquent mortgages in Kentucky and the United States as gathered with data reported on a
quarterly basis from the Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey between
1979 and 2008 second quarter.
Figure 2:
Past Due Mortgage Loans in Kentucky and the United States 1979 to 2008

Note: Seasonally Adjusted
Source: Housing Foreclosures in Kentucky, Program Review and Investigations Committee,
Legislative Research Commission; Emily Spurlcok, Colleen Kennedy, Carlos Lopes, and Mike
Clark, Ph.D., Frankfort, Kentucky; July 9, 2009.
You will notice the sharp climb between third quarter 2007 and second quarter 2008 for both
the United States and the State of Kentucky. The delinquency rate in the United States has
risen to a seasonally adjusted rate of 9.64 percent for third quarter 2009, which this graph does
not extend to, while the current percent for Kentucky is unavailable 6.
6

Mortgage Bankers Association. “Delinquencies Continue to Climb in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey.”,
November 19, 2009, http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/71112.htm
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Not all borrowers that are delinquent on their mortgage payments have a property that enters
the foreclosure process. However, as expected with the rise in delinquent mortgage loans,
there is a rise in the percentage of loans that enter foreclosure in Kentucky. Figure 3 depicts
the percentage of loans entering foreclosure in Kentucky and the United States between 1979
and 2008, as gathered from data produced by the Mortgage Bankers Association, National
Delinquency Survey.
Figure 3
Percentage of Loans Entering Foreclosure in Kentucky and the United States, 1979-2008

Source: Jefferson Circuit Court, Office of the Master Commissioner4
Between the years 2000 and 2007 Kentucky had a higher percentage of foreclosures than the
United States, however by 2008 first quarter the United States had a higher percentage of
foreclosures than Kentucky by approximately 0.22%. By 2008 the percentage of foreclosures in
Kentucky had begun to decrease while the percentage of delinquent mortgage loans increased,
this is likely due to the sheer number of delinquent loans, which could be too much for the
Kentucky foreclosure process to handle therefore lenders are not beginning the foreclosure
process after the typical 90 day period4.
Once a lender has filed for and received a motion for default judgment by the court, the
property is referred to the master commissioner of Louisville/Jefferson County to be sold at
auction. With the rise in delinquent borrower mortgage payments and the percentage of
foreclosures in Kentucky, the Master Commissioner of Louisville/Jefferson County has seen a
spike in the number of properties that are scheduled to be sold and are sold through the
master commissioner sale auctions. The following graph (Figure 4) depicts the number of
properties scheduled for sale and sold in Louisville through the Master Commissioner sales
auction.
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Figure 4
Number of Properties Scheduled for Sale and Sold Through Master Commissioner 1996-2008

Source: Jefferson Circuit Court, Office of the Master Commissioner

4

While the number of sold properties for the Master Commissioner auction sale in Louisville
have remained fairly constant since 2004, the number of scheduled for sale continues to climb
to the most recent data from 2008. The data for the properties scheduled for sale and sold
through Master Commissioner sale in 2009 for Jefferson County are not yet available. This data
could indicate that many lenders or local tax commissioners are holding off on initiating the
foreclosure process on a mortgage loan because the Master Commissioner cannot handle the
volume of sales required to date, due to lack of resources to sell that many properties and a
possible lack of qualified buyers.
Trends Leading to Foreclosure in Kentucky
While there has been wide speculation about the factors that have contributed to the
foreclosures in Louisville, Kentucky, and around the United States, the Commonwealth of
Kentucky Legislative Research Commission has determined these three factors to have “fed”
the foreclosure crisis4.
The reasons are:
1. Change in the Real Estate Finance Market
2. Home Prices and Interest Rates
3. Weak Labor Market
Again, these reasons have not been defined as the sole reasons for the foreclosure situation in
Louisville and Kentucky, however just identified as three key contributors.
11

The change in the real estate finance market was influenced by the mistaken perception that
less risk was associated with government-backed securities being issued by organizations such
as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, and private nongovernment agencies, or banks.
Investment analysts had always assumed that government-back securities were more secure
than typical mortgage backed securities, and analysts still perceive that government-backed
securities are less risky 7. Another factor contributing to the change in the real estate market
was the incentive for lenders to not fully screen potential borrowers at the time of origination
of the loan. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig argued that lenders did not fully disclose to
investors the different levels of risk associated with the security backing of different types of
mortgages issued to different borrowers. Many investors bought the risky pooled securities
without knowing what they were truly purchasing8. Finally, the increased use of innovative
mortgage products, such as hybrid adjusted rate mortgages, contributed to the change in the
real estate markets. Hybrid adjusted rate mortgages included 2/28 or 3/27; the first number
refers to the number of years with a fixed rate and the second number the number of years
remaining at an adjusted rate 9.
The second reason cited for the increase in the number of foreclosures was the constant
changing in the interest rates of the loan, such as an adjusted rate mortgage. According to the
Freddie Mac 21st Annual ARM Survey, many of the ARM loans were started with low interest
rates to entice borrowers, and then the interest rate would steadily climb9. The second factor
influencing this reason was the decline in house prices across the nation and in Kentucky. The
LRC concludes that the change in housing prices were a result of a weakening housing market
demand, perhaps due to the increase in interest rates. The following graph (Figure 5) illustrates
the changes in housing price index for the U.S. and Kentucky between 1999 and 2009. The
graph shows a steady climb in the housing price index for the nation and the state between
1999 and mid-2008, while between mid-2008 and 2009 prices have begun to drop sharply,
while slightly leveling off again in 2009.

7

Zendrian, Alexandra. “Invest in…Mortgage Backed Securities?” Forbes.com September 9, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/08/mortgage-backed-securities-intelligent-investing-spreads.html
8
Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig. “Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screaning? Evidence From Subprime Loans 20012006.” January 2008, http://faculty.london.edu/vvig/index_files/securitize.pdf
9
st
Freddie Mac News Release. “Freddie Mac Releases Results of it’s 21 Annual ARM Survey.”, January 5, 2005,
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/rates/2005/20050105_04armsurvey.html
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Figure 5
Changes in House Prices
House Price Index for U.S. and Kentucky, 1999 to 2009

Source: Federal Housing Finance Agency4
The final reason cited for the rise in foreclosures in Kentucky is a weakening of the labor market
in Kentucky. The unemployment rates for the United States and Kentucky have risen sharply
between March 2008 and January 2009, from approximately 5% to 10%. The graph (Figure 6)
below shows the changes in unemployment rates for the United States and Kentucky between
1999 and 2009. The Louisville unemployment rate reached a 10-year high in 2008 at 6.4%10.

10

Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, Unemployment Rate (%) for Kentucky Counties: Annual Averages,
http://www.thinkkentucky.com/EDIS/Deskbook/files/UIRatesCty.PDF
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Figure 6
Unemployment Rate for Kentucky and United States, 1999 to 2009

Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor. Bureau. Labor; U.S. Dept. of Labor. Bureau. Local.4
The Effects on Government
The number of foreclosures has led to many negative effects on mortgages, borrowers,
servicers, governments, and investors. Some of the associated costs from foreclosures fall on
the governments in Louisville, the State of Kentucky, and the federal government; such as the
upkeep of vacant properties, the loss of tax revenue, and declining property values in a
community. For example, the U.S. Joint Economic Committee indicated that the foreclosure
crisis due to subprime lending would cause Kentucky to lose an estimated $3.4 million dollars in
property tax revenue between third quarter 2007 and fourth quarter 2009 11. When the
11

Congressional Joint Economic Committee. “The Subprime Lending Crisis: The Economic Impact on Wealth,
Property Values, and Tax Revenues, and How We Got Here.” October 2007,
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government and the communities of the nation began to suffer from the foreclosure crisis, the
federal government stepped in to offer assistance, in programs such as the National
Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program.

Research Design

The National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program was authorized by the Neighborhood
Reinvestment Corporation Act (NRC) (42 U.S.C. 8101-8107). This program made grants
available to counseling intermediaries approved by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) or the NRC to provide mortgage foreclosure mitigation assistance to high
need areas like Louisville, Kentucky. The program is targeted towards the subprime housing
market to help eliminate the default and foreclosure of mortgages of owner-occupied singlefamily homes. In addition to granting to states and areas of greatest need, the Act authorizes
grants to be provided to approved counseling intermediaries based on geographic analysis of
the nation by the NRC which determines where there is a prevalence of subprime mortgages
that are risky and likely to fail. Any HUD or NRC approved counseling intermediary must meet
certain mortgage foreclosure mitigation assistance counseling requirements set forth by the
NRC and approved by HUD 12.
The following regulations from the Act authorized NRC funds to be spent with the National
Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program:
i.
The foreclosure mitigation assistance is to be made only to home-owners of owneroccupied homes with mortgages in default or in danger of default.
ii.
Funds used by approved counseling intermediaries and State Housing Agencies shall
involve a reasonable analysis of the borrower’s financial situation.
iii.
The NRC funds must be awarded to States and areas of greatest need within 60 days of
enactment.
iv.
The NRC or HUD-approved counseling entities and State Housing Finance Agencies
receiving funds must demonstrate a capacity and experience in working with financial
institutions as well as borrowers facing default, delinquency and foreclosure as well as
documented counseling capacity, outreach capacity, past successful performance and
positive outcomes with documented counseling plans, loan workout agreements and
loan modification agreements.
v.
Up to $5,000,000 of the NRC funds may be made available to mortgage foreclosure and
default mitigation counseling capacity of counseling intermediaries through NRC
http://jec.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Reports.Reports&ContentRecord_id=c6627bb2-7e9c-9af9-7ac732b94d398d27&Region_id=&Issue_id=
12
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation Act (42 U.S.C. 8101-8107),
http://www.nw.org/network/nfmcp/documents/nrcappropriation.pdf
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vi.
vii.
viii.

training courses with HUD or NRC-approved counseling intermediaries and their
partners.
Up to 4% of the NRC was eligible to be used towards administrative expenses to carry
out the activities.
The NRC funds may be used for outreach and advertising.
The NRC must report biannually to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
as well as the Senate Banking Committee and House Financial Services Committee on its
efforts to mitigate mortgage default. To date, two bi-annual reports have been
submitted to the above referenced agencies.

Upon signing of the Act by President George W. Bush, NeighborWorks America was selected, as
part of the Act, to serve as the administrating agency for the National Foreclosure Mitigation
Counseling Program. The Act directed NeighborWorks to distribute the $180 million in funds
to the areas that were defined as “areas of greatest need” and based upon areas that were
determined to have the highest priority. The “areas of greatest need” are defined as the areas
where the rates of subprime lending, delinquent loans, and foreclosures are at their highest. To
disseminate the NFMC funding, NeighborWorks America created a competitive grant process to
be used in awarding grants in subsequent rounds of funding to HUD-approved Housing
Counseling Intermediaries and State Housing Finance Agencies to provide housing foreclosure
counseling. Of the $180 million, $130 million was allocated by February 2008. On February 1,
2008 the Housing Partnership Network, a HUD-Approved Housing Counseling Intermediary, was
awarded $7,429,993 to be spread throughout the nation among their network partners1. The
Housing Partnership, Inc., as a member of the Housing Partnership Network, was provided a
total of approximately $1,700,000 of the $7,429,993 to provide foreclosure counseling
assistance to the residents of Louisville, Kentucky. The Housing Partnership Network submitted
an application to NeighborWorks America seeking funding for the foreclosure mitigation
counseling program containing identified MSA’s from the list of Areas of Greatest Need in the
National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program Funding Announcement 13. Louisville was
the only identifiable area of greatest need in Kentucky for foreclosure mitigation counseling
and strategies. The criteria for determining the areas of greatest need are:
1.
Number of delinquent loans (30-90 days)
2.
Percent of loans delinquent (30-90 days)
3.
Percent of loans in foreclosure process or REO (Real Estate Owned)
4.
Percent of loans that are subprime
The Housing Partnership, Inc. received its funds from the Housing Partnership Network central
offices in the spring of 2008. Upon receiving their funding amount, HPI began immediately
13

NeighborWorks America, National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program Funding Announcement, January
15, 2008.
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marketing its program to the residents of Louisville in order to expend its funds in a timely
manner and effectively gauge the current foreclosure situation. According to the Foreclosure
Mitigation Counseling program funding announcement, all entities that received funds through
the initial funding cycle were to have all funds expended by December 31, 2009. The Housing
Partnership, Inc. is approximately 100% expended.
The Housing Partnership Network received their funding of $7,429,993 from NeighborWorks
America on or about March 1, 2008. Shortly after this date, the funds were made available to
the recipients of the NeighborWorks America grants. The Housing Partnership, Inc. received
approximately $1,700,000 through two funding cycles from the Housing Partnership Network 14.
Throughout the program period the Housing Partnership Network has been required to provide
quarterly progress reports to NeighborWorks America in regards to their current expenditure of
funds and clients served. Due to the Housing Partnership Network being a national
organization, they had to rely upon their network members, like HPI, to provide these quarterly
progress reports to the Network, which were then relayed to NeighborWorks America. The
quarterly progress reports allowed NeighborWorks America to accurately determine which
funding recipients were expending their funds in a timely manner and met the December 31,
2009 expenditure date. Any funds not allocated in a timely and effective manner were open to
recapture from NeighborWorks America. The recaptured funds were then distributed to
funding recipients who were able to spend their funding amounts in a timely manner according
to their funding agreement with NeighborWorks America.
The Housing Partnership, Inc. remained on schedule and had nearly all of its funds expended by
the December 31, 2009 deadline. As of October 1, 2009 the Housing Partnership, Inc. has been
able to provide foreclosure mitigation counseling assistance to 1,619 households in Louisville.
The Housing Partnership, Inc.’s (HPI) mission is to create, sustain and promote access to
affordable housing opportunities in Louisville. The Housing Partnership is a non-profit private
corporation with a board of directors who oversee policy and housing operation initiatives. The
current President of HPI is Mr. F. Lynn Luallen and he has a staff of 58 employees to assist with
housing efforts15.
As a recipient of funds for the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling (NFMC) program, HPI
is looking to determine what impact was made on the housing market around Louisville.

14
15

Julie VanShuren, Housing Partnership, Inc., Interview conducted on October 22, 2009.
The Housing Partnership Inc., About Us, http://www.housingpartnershipinc.org/default.asp?q_areaprimaryid=4
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Data Research and Analysis

The Housing Partnership, Inc. was able to provide a data set consisting of the following data
items as explained below. The data were summarized from a data bank collected for the
National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program by the Housing Partnership. The variables
in the data set provided were:
1. Household Type
2. Default Reason Type
3. Lien Holder Name
4. Payment Status Type
5. Lien Holder Type
6. Lien Position
7. Term Type
8. Current Mortgage Interest Rate
As of October 2009, 1,619 households had sought foreclosure mitigation counseling services
from the Housing Partnership.
Household Type:
The National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program allows for the identification of eight
(8) different household types. The chart below identifies the eight different household types.
The largest category of households seeking foreclosure counseling assistance was married
households with children, at 28.3% of all households reporting. The next two largest amount
households seeking assistance are female-headed single-parent households at 22.1%, followed
by single adult households at 20.4%. The three largest categories reporting categories seeking
assistance represent 70.7% of the total reported household types.
Figure 7:
Types of Households Requesting Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Assistance,
Louisville, Kentucky, 2008-09
Household Type
Frequency Percent
Married with children
458
28.3
Female-headed single-parent
household
357
22.1
Single adult
330
20.4
Married without children
193
11.9
Other
158
9.8
Male-headed single-parent household
90
5.6
Two or more unrelated adults
27
1.7
Unknown
6
0.4
Total
1,619
100.0
18

Default Reason Type:
A critical component in determining the level of counseling to provide a household seeking
foreclosure mitigation counseling assistance is the reason for default in the household, or the
reason for potential default if the household is current on payments. The National Foreclosure
Mitigation Counseling program provided a listing of ten reasons for default. The two most
common reasons for payment defaults from a household are loss of income and reduction in
income. Loss of income was listed by 36.0% of households seeking assistance, while reduction
in income represents 30.3% of households seeking assistance, combined the two reasons makeup 66.2% of the default reasons from households seeking assistance. The chart below
summarizes the categories of reason for default.
Figure 8:
Types of Default Reasons from Households Requesting Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling
Services 2008-09
Default Reason
Frequency Percent
Loss of income
582
36.0
Reduction in income
490
30.3
Increase in Expense
109
6.7
Medical Issues
95
5.9
Divorce/Separation
91
5.6
TOTAL
1619
100.0
Lien Holder:
The Housing Partnership required households to identify their lien holder name, whether that
institution was a bank, mortgage lender, private individual, etc. The lien holder data generated
over 140 different names of lien holders used by households seeking foreclosure mitigation
counseling assistance. With too many different lien holders to identify, the two most common
lien holders indentified were Countrywide at 11.1%, a mortgage lender, and Wells Fargo at
9.8%, a banking institution.
Payment Status:
To provide the relevant course of counseling to households who are late on their mortgage
payments, the Housing Partnership needed to determine the current payment status of each
household that was seeking assistance. The National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling
program allowed for five categories for determining current payment status. The five payment
status categories were; current on payments , 30-60 days late, 61-90 days late, 91-120 days
19

late, and 120+ days late, . Of the households contacting the Housing Partnership, the most
frequent payment status was households that were in excess of 120 days late on their
mortgage payments at nearly 35.27% of all households reporting. The following chart
summarizes the remaining breakdown for payment status of households seeking assistance.
Figure 9:
Ranges for Payment Delinquency for Households Requesting Foreclosure Mitigation
Counseling Services 2008-09
Payment Delinquency
Current
30-60 Days Late
61-90 Days Late
91-120 Days Late
120+ Days Late
TOTAL

Frequency Percent
272
16.8
341
21.1
261
16.1
174
10.8
571
35.3
1619
100.0

Lien Holder Type:
The National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program required households seeking
assistance to identify their type of lien holder. The Housing Partnership indentified five
different types of lien holders that households reported when seeking assistance. The two
most common types of lien holders indentified were banks at 45.95% and mortgage lenders
52.01%. Households reporting banks and mortgage lenders made up 98.0%. The following
chart summarizes all types of lien holders reported.
Figure 10:
Types of Lien Holders used by Households Requesting Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling
Services 2008-09
Lien Holder
Frequency Percent
Mortgage Lender
842
52.0
Bank
744
46.0
Credit Union
22
1.4
Individual (Private)
10
0.6
Insurance Company
1
0.1
TOTAL
1619
100

Lien Position:
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The National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program required households to identify the
type of lien they had on their property. The most common lien type was a first mortgage by a
home owner at 88.6% of total households reporting. 11.1% of the households reporting
identified as having second mortgages on their property, in addition to their first mortgage on
the property they have. According to the American Heritage Dictionary, a second mortgage is
defined as a mortgage taken out on property that already has one mortgage, with priority in
settlement of claims given to the earlier mortgage 16. The following chart summarizes the
different lien positions identified.
Figure 11:
Type of Mortgages Households Requesting Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Services
Needed Assistance With 2008-09
Mortgage Type
First Mortgage
Second Mortgage
Third Mortgage
TOTAL

Frequency Percent
1435
88.63
179
11.06
5
0.31
1619
100

Term Type:
The program sought to identify the type of term on the mortgage of each household seeking
assistance from the Housing Partnership. The data from the Housing Partnership identified 15
different term types from households reporting. The most frequent term type from households
was a 30 year mortgage at 83.8%. The remaining 14 different term types are spread out over
the remaining approximate 16%. In addition, there are five (5) households who did not identify
their term type from the data set. Although a 30 year mortgage was identified as the most
frequent term type, the data do not provide an explanation of whether the mortgage is a fixed
rate or an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM).
Current Mortgage Interest Rate:
Each of the 1,619 households seeking foreclosure mitigation counseling assistance was required
to identify their current mortgage rate at the time of seeking assistance, not what the original
term rate was at the time of receiving mortgage. The mortgage interest rates ranged from 0.00
– 22.00%, with the most common interest rate at 6.00%. The First Quartile for the current rate
was 6.375%, while the third quartile was 9.49%, making the inter-quartile range 3.1%. The
mean current interest rate was determined to be 7.98% with a standard deviation of 2.4. The
current rates skewed to the right (coefficient of skewness of 1.08, with kurtosis of 6.97, both
16
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statistically significantly greater than the values for a normal, 0 and 3). The Kernel density
below describes details the current mortgage rate distribution.

Figure 12
Households Requesting Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Services Current Mortgage Rate
Distribution in Louisville, Kentucky 2008-09
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Reasons for Default
When a household contacts the Housing Partnership seeking home foreclosure mitigation
counseling assistance, one of the important determinations to make is how that household has
become late on its payments or why they might become late on their payments if no payments
have been missed to date. The following multinomial logit model will assist in understanding
the characteristics of the reasons for default by households reporting to the Housing
Partnership.

Findings:
Overall, the multinomial logit model proved to be statistically significant (p=0.0001). The
independent variables varied in their statistical significance between the six reasons for default.
There appeared to be no repeating pattern of significance across any of the statistical
significance findings between the five reasons for default. Figure 13 below provides the
coefficient response for the statistically significant variables with marginal effects.
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Figure 13
Households Requesting Housing Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Services: Effects of
Variables on Reason for Default 2008-09
Increase Increase Poor Budget
Divorce/
in
in Loan
Management Reduction
Predictor Variables
Separation Expense Payment Skills
in Income
Current Mortgage Rate
-0.003
Lien Position: First
Mortgage
-0.022
-0.079
Female-headed singleparent household
0.078
-0.163
Male-headed singleparent household
0.273
-0.011
Married without
children
0.054
Other
0.048
0.030
Single adult
0.061
0.034
Two or more unrelated
adults
0.176
0.157
Lien Holder: Bank
0.015*
Lien Holder: Credit
Union
Lien Holder: Individual
Lien Holder: Insurance
Co.
Term Type: 2/28
0.061
30-60 days late
-0.021
0.002*
61-90 days late
-0.021
91-120 days late
-0.033
-0.025
120 + days late
-0.027
0.002*
* Statistically Significant at 90%
Confidence Interval
Unmarked Statistically Significant at
95% Confidence Interval
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According to the results of the data, each one percent increase in the current mortgage rate
made it 0.3% less likely that the household would cite an increase in loan payments as their
reason for default. The higher the current rate, the less likely is an increase to occur, as ARMs
are linked to current interest rates in the economy.
Households that have only a first mortgage are .2% less likely to cite increase in payments as
the reason for default and are 7.9% less likely to cite reduction in income as their reason for
default. Households that do not have only a first mortgage may be more likely to cite increase
in payments, as their second and third mortgages probably have high interest rates and these
households seeking assistance cannot continue to make payments on the rapidly rising interest
rates.
The logit model results suggest that Female-headed households were 7.8% more likely to cite
divorce or separation as their reason for default than those households who were married with
children; however these households were 16.3% less likely to cite a reduction in income as their
reason for default than those households who were married with children. This result supports
earlier theories that single headed households, such as female headed households are more
likely to be operating on a fairly constant income and therefore are less likely to lose their
consistent source of income, and are more affected by divorce. Married with children
households are probably dual headed working families that would be susceptible to divorce and
reduction in household income. Male headed households, as expected, are 27.3% more likely
to report divorce than a married household with children, however these households are 1.1%
less likely to report poor budget management as a reason for default. This outcome is difficult
to suggest a reason as poor budget management can be broadly interpreted, but one
suggestion could be that married with children households are more likely to encounter
problems with payments if they have poor management skills. Single adult households (6.1%)
and two or more adult households (17.6%) are both more likely to suggest divorce or
separation as their reason for default than households who are married with children, this
result is expected as married with children households are not currently suffering from divorce
currently. In addition, single adult households (3.4%) and two or more unrelated adult
households (15.7%) are more likely to list an increase in expenses as their reason for default
than married with children households; this can be attributed to a sudden increase due to a
divorce or sudden loss in household income by one of the household members.
The results of the logit model suggest that households who have a mortgage loan from a bank
over a mortgage loan from a mortgage lender are 1.5% more likely to cite an increase in
expenses as their reason for default. This result may be from banks increasing their interest
rates, thus increasing the household expenses.
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As expected, the model results suggest that households with a 2/28 hybrid mortgage are 6.1%
more likely than 30-year mortgage holders to cite an increased in loan payment as their reason
for default. This result would have been predicted and is further substantiated by the logit
model results.
The final logit results suggest that anybody who is late on their mortgage is less likely to cite an
increase in loan payment as their reason for default than those households who are current on
their payments. Households which are already late do not have to incur an increase in interest
rates to report mortgage payment problems, while households which are current are likely
looking forward to problems created by increasing loan payments which have been announced.
Households who are 30-60 days late on their mortgage payments are 0. 2% more likely to cite
poor budget management as a reason for default than those households who are current on
their mortgage payments. This result could be anticipated and poor budget management could
result in a household that was not in danger of missing payments suddenly unable to make
their mortgage payments. Therefore, responsible households that are only 30-60 days late may
seek mitigation counseling services due to the unexpected financial situation resulting from
poor budget management. However, it is important to note, as stated earlier, poor budget
management is a broadly interpreted category that may mean several different situations to
several different households. Finally, households that are over 120 days late are 0. 2% more
likely to cite poor budget management as a reason for default than those households which are
current. This result is expected and confirms suggested theories as reason for default.
The data used for the multinomial logit model are somewhat incomplete and omitted many
significant variables to accurately determine the effects of each reason for default. However, I
do believe the data produced many results that supported common theories for each reason
for default.
Multiple Regression Model: Days Late
As the Housing Partnership records the number of days late for a client, it is important to
understand what type of households are those that are most likely to become late on their
payments.
A regression model indicates that five independent variables at the 95 percent confidence
interval and two independent variables at the 90 percent confidence level are statistically
significant. The following results in Figure 14 provide the details of the regression model.
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Figure 14
Regression Model Results: Households Requesting Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Services
Influences on their Current Interest Rates 2008-09
Source
Model
Residual
Total
Current Interest Rate
First Mortgage
Female-headed Single
Family Household
Male-headed Single
Family Household
Married without
children
Other
Single Adult
Two or more adults
Unknown
Bank
Credit Union
Individual
Insur. Company
2/28 Mortgage
30-60 Days Late
61-90 Days Late
91-120 Days Late
Over 120 Days Late
_cons

SS
1043.19605
8441.13578

df
17
1600

MS
61.364
5.2757

9484.33183

1617

5.8654

Coef.

t

Number of obs
F( 17, 1600)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

1618
11.63
0.000
0.110
0.1005
2.2969

-1.9539

Std. Err.
0.1851

-10.55

P>t
<0.001*

[95% Conf.
-2.3169

Interval]
-1.5908

-0.3392

0.1626

-2.09

0.037*

-0.6581

-0.0203

-0.5457

0.2656

-2.05

0.040*

-1.0668

-0.0247

-0.3033
-0.3477
-0.4612
-0.0482
-0.2214
-0.8361
-0.6024
1.5607
-0.3441
1.1672
0.3627
0.4414
0.2489
0.3256
10.0491

0.1978
0.2124
0.1665
0.4566
0.9457
0.1169
0.5001
0.7330
2.3060
0.3663
0.1900
0.2027
0.2272
0.1726
0.2255

-1.53
-1.64
-2.77
-0.11
-0.23
-7.15
-1.20
2.13
-0.02
3.19
1.91
2.18
1.10
1.89
44.57

0.125
0.102
0.006*
0.916
0.815
<0.001*
0.229
0.033*
0.881
0.001*
0.057^
0.030*
0.274
0.059^
0.000

-0.6912
-0.7642
-0.7878
-0.9437
-2.0763
-1.0654
-1.5834
0.1230
-4.8672
0.4488
-0.0101
0.0438
-0.1968
-0.0130
9.6068

0.0846
0.0689
-0.1346
0.8473
1.6336
-0.6067
0.3785
2.9984
4.1790
1.8856
0.7354
0.8390
0.6945
0.6642
10.4913

* Statistically Significant at the 95% Confidence Level

^Statistically Significant at the 90% Confidence Interval

The regression model was conducted to determine whether or not there were certain
characteristics that influence a household’s interest rate. As predicted households with which
have only a first mortgage are have an interest rate that 1.95% less than households who would
have second and/or third mortgages. In addition, households who received their loans from a
bank have interest rates that are approximately .8% less than those who receive their loans
from a mortgage lending institution. This result suggests that lending institutions lent more
aggressively with possibly adjusted rate mortgages. Finally the model suggested there was very
little differences between the amount of time a household seeking assistance was delinquent in
their mortgage payments, for example a household that was 30-60 days late had approximately
the same higher interest rate as a household that over 120 days late. These results suggest that
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households with greater delinquency were struggling to make payments just as much as
households who were only two months delinquent. This result could also suggest that it may
be difficult to help a delinquent homeowner that is unable to make payments on their current
mortgage since their rates are not shown to decrease over time.
Analysis Conclusions

In conclusion, the regression model and the multinomial logit model indicate the following
results to the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: How do the characteristics of a household type, household’s lien position, lien
holder type, the type of mortgage term, and the days late on a mortgage payment likely affect a
household’s reason for default?
Conclusion 1: The arbitrarily pre-determined categories make accurately reporting the reason a
household is default on their mortgage payments difficult. Although, the logit model returned
results to support many common perceptions, such as female-headed single parent households
were more likely to cite divorce or separation as their reason for default than households who
were married with children, the model also reported that households who were late on their
payments were less likely to report an increase loan payments as their reason for default than
households who were not late at all. Results such as these are difficult to interpret because it is
hard to explain how a household that is experiencing an increase in loan payments could not be
more delinquent on their payments than a household that is current on the mortgage payment.
The types of data results stated above support the hypothesis that the pre-determined
categories lead households reporting to the Housing Partnership to respond in a manner that
may not be reflective of their true financial situation.
Hypothesis 2: The type of household, the lien position, lien holder type, the type of mortgage
term, and the days late on a mortgage payment influence the interest rates of households
seeking foreclosure mitigation counseling assistance.
Conclusion 2: The regression model indicates there some strong influences on a household’s
mortgage interest rate. For example, one of the results indicated households who are 30-60
days late or over 120 days late are expected to have the same increased interest rate amounts
over those households who are current on their mortgage payments. Assumption could have
been made that, the more delinquent a household became on their mortgage payments the
higher the interest rates would be due to constant rising of the rates by the banks. However,
this is a cautionary sign, as a household that cannot make payments at the higher interest rate
at day 60, will probably not be able to make those payments over 120 days late either.
Study Limitations

The two most frequent limitations to the data analysis that was encountered were the
categories of data collected and the lack of data on the outcome of the counseling services.
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The National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program provided the Housing Partnership with
a data collecting program that included several data fields with predetermined responses. If a
household did not meet one of the predetermined data fields, then they would either select
“other” or “unknown”. “Other” and “Unknown” do not accurately reflect the true
characteristic of the household seeking assistance and it makes it difficult to understand the
statistical significance for the variables associated with these data fields. Approximately 16% of
all households seeking assistance selected “other” or “unknown” for their household type. The
predetermined data fields proved an easier and uniform response for the collection of data,
however for accurately evaluating the effectiveness of the program is difficult to manage due
this uniform process.
Another study limitation was the inability of the data collection program to effectively describe
the characteristics of a household’s mortgage. For example, the data system may report a
household has a 30-year mortgage at 5.0% interest; however the reporting program does not
describe whether that mortgage is a fixed rate mortgage or an adjusted rate mortgage. In
addition, the data does not provide information regarding what the interest rate was when the
household acquired the mortgage, or the year they received their mortgage.
The final study limitation was the lack of data to incorporate into the regression models and the
multinomial logit model. The data did not provide key data fields such as; household ethnicity,
occupations (if any), level of counseling received, and especially outcomes. Different
households probably would not require the same amount or type of foreclosure mitigation
counseling assistance from the Housing Partnership; however the data could not provide this
information.
If the addresses of the households were included the location of the households may provide
insight into the targets of predatory lending and those types of households who were affected
by predatory lending techniques. However, due to privacy commitments from the Housing
Partnership much of the data regarding ethnicity, names, addresses and other identifiable
information could not be included in the data set but is recorded by the Housing Partnership for
the national Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program.
Conclusion and Recommendations

This research paper analyzed the effects of the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling
program in Louisville as administered and operated by the Housing Partnership, Inc. based in
Louisville, Kentucky. The findings in this paper can be provided to the Housing Partnership and
policy makers when determining the effectiveness of the program and ways to improve future
foreclosure mitigation programs. Although, due to privacy concerns other data characteristics
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will be available the evaluators of the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling program that
were not readily available to this evaluation.
The multinomial logit model attempted to establish a link between the type of household, their
characteristics, and their most common reason for default. Policy makers can begin to possibly
create programs that are more specifically targeted to reason for default as oppose to a general
mortgage default. The Federal Government could create tailored programs such as subsidizing
mortgage loans short term for those households who are just experiencing a sudden lost of
income, such as a single parent household who just went through a divorce.
Finally, the regression model provided further evidence there are certain variables that can
impact a households current interest rate. Policy makers can could results from the regression
model to provide insight into potential effectiveness of the program. For example, the
regression model results indicated that no matter how late a household was on their mortgage
payment it would be unlikely for that household to be able to manage their payments at their
current interest rate. Therefore, foreclosure mitigation counseling may not be the answer,
rather policy makers may want to examine policies to help subsidize homeowner’s mortgages
for a defined time period or until household income situation improves.
In closing, this study provides a starting point to policy makers and the Housing Partnership in
ways they can operate their program to provide the best and most capable service to their
clients.
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